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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

citizens access to courts and to meaningful participation in
enforcement claims to protect their interests under the CWA. Because
his interests were not represented by the TDEC administrative
enforcement, Jones had a legitimate claim. The case was reversed and
remanded.
Kevin Rohnstock

SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Kaukauna v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 214 F.3d 888 (7th Cir.
2000) (holding the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's
interpretation of Hydropower Operators' rights, as successors in
interest, under a deed was unreasonable).
This action involved a canal connecting the Fox and Wisconsin
Rivers. In 1846, Congress gave the State of Wisconsin all public lands
and water rights necessary for both the canal's construction and the
Wisconsin completed the canal
Fox River's improvement.
construction in 1951. Succumbing to monetary problems in 1853,
Wisconsin transferred its "improvements" interest-including all rights
of way, dams, locks, canals, and waterpower-to the Wisconsin
Improvement Company ("Improvement Company").
Falling into bankruptcy in 1866, the Improvement Company sold
to the Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Company ("Canal
interest
its
Company"). Concerned that a private company owned the canal,
Congress entered into an agreement with the Canal Company.
According to the agreement, the Canal Company deeded all property
and property right's between the Wisconsin River and the Fox Riverincluding its locks, dams, canals, and franchises-to the United States
Specifically, the United States owned all rights
("1872 Deed").
associated with navigation. Likewise, the Canal Company retained all
property not needed for navigational purposes, including waterpower
produced by the dams, the use of surplus water not needed for
navigational purposes, and pieces or parcels of land necessary for the
enjoyment of the Canal Company's property.
The petitioners, the City of Kaukauna and others (collectively
"Hydropower Operators"), operated hydropower projects at federally
owned dams on the Lower Fox River. Such projects were downstream
from a government-owned dam ("Menasha dam"), which controlled
Lake Winnebago's water level and regulated the Fox River's flow upon
leaving the lake. In September 1997, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission ("FERC") charged the Hydropower Operators $338,984
for retroactive "headwater benefits," pursuant to the Federal Power Act
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("FPA"). Additionally, FERC required the Hydropower Operators to
pay annual "headwater benefits" charges. The Hydropower Operators
objected that such charges were unjustified because they owned the
"headwater benefits" rights as a result of conveyances, and, therefore,
FERC could not charged them. FERC rejected the Hydropower
Operators' argument, finding that their 1872 Deed rights did not
cover the 1937 Menasha dam improvements. Subsequently, the
Hydropower Operators requested the United States Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals review the issue.
The court considered whether FERC's FPA power authorized fee
charging, as compensation for "headwater benefits," to any
hydropower project, if a project benefited from an upstream dam or
an upstream improvement. The court declared that it would affirm
FERC's order only if it found FERC's 1872 Deed interpretation
reasonable and legal.
The Hydropower Operators argued they were the Canal
Company's successor in interest, thus establishing them as the owners
of water rights for which FERC had charged them. Further, they
argued that the 1872 Deed explicitly reserved all of the Fox River's
actual and potential waterpower interests to the Canal Company,
including those that would later be termed "headwater benefits" in
conjunction with the FPA. Specifically, the Hydropower Operators
asserted that the "headwater benefits" for which FERC charged them
were part of the "waterpower" and "surplus water" that they already
owned, pursuant to the 1872 Deed. The court acknowledged that
"headwater benefits" were not depicted as a separate interest in the
FPA until 1920. Hence, it did not appear "headwater benefits" were
recognized when the 1872 Deed was constructed.
FERC proffered three arguments challenging the Hydropower
Operators' ownership of "headwater benefits." First, FERC contended
the 1872 Deed applied only to "waterpower" and "surplus water"
developed at the Hydropower Operators' individual dam sites and
were restricted to those specific dam sites. The court responded that
the 1872 Deed's language denoted that "waterpower" was not
applicable only to particular sites. The court categorized "waterpower"
to possess a more expansive meaning, which included both water flow
enhancement and the energy contribution of the corresponding head.
The court found FERC's limited meaning of "waterpower" constituted
an unreasonable interpretation of the 1872 Deed.
Second, FERC argued that based upon the interplay of relevant
FPA provisions, "headwater benefits" could not be incorporated into
the Hydropower Operators' "water power" and "surplus water" rights.
FERC averred that "headwater benefits" were a distinct concept from
"waterpower," and by deeming otherwise, the court would violate
congressional intent. The court countered that it was not interpreting
the FPA, but, instead, the 1872 Deed and related conveyances.
Accordingly, the court noted that it construed the 1872 Deed as
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executed at a time prior to "headwater benefits" being thought of or
even termed.
Finally, FERC argued that the 1872 Deed could not have
transferred Menasha dam's "waterpower" rights because such rights
belonged to that dam's private owners in 1855. Hence, FERC
contended the Canal Company could not have conveyed what it did
not own. The court agreed that the Canal Company did not own any
"waterpower" rights at the Menasha dam. However, the court upheld
the Hydropower Operators argument that the Menasha dam's release
of stored water created additional power potential at their downstream
hydropower projects and such energy belonged to them. The court
declared that the 1872 Deed reserved an increased "waterpower"
enhancement for the Canal Company. Accordingly, the court held
that the Hydropower Operators already owned the "waterpower"
rights, thus making FERC's argument regarding the Menasha dam's
"waterpower" ownership rights unreasonable.
The court vacated FERC's Order on Rehearing and remanded the
case for the entry of an order consistent with the opinion.
SaraFranklin
United States v. Krilich, 209 F.3d 968 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding the
federal district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the
Environmental Protection Agency's case based on Krilich's violation of
a federal statute).
Robert Krilich ("Krilich") was the developer of the Royce
Renaissance Property in Oakbrook Terrace, Illinois.
The
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") charged Krilich with
violating section 301 (a) of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") for
discharging fill into a wetland without first obtaining a section 404
permit. To settle the dispute, Krilich entered into a consent decree
with EPA. The consent decree required that Krilich pay a fine of
$185,000, remediate some of the filled wetland, and build a 3.1 acre
replacement wetland on the development property. The consent
decree included a penalty provision for any delay in completing the
replacement wetland.
Upon Krilich's failure to complete the substitute wetland by the
date specified in the consent decree, EPA moved to enforce the
penalty provision. The district court granted EPA's motion and fined
Krilich $1,307,500.
Krilich appealed the district court judgment
arguing that the deadlines had been modified, the doctrines of
impossibility and frustration excused his non-performance, and the
government was equitably estopped from enforcing the penalty
provisions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment but remanded
the case to correct an error made in calculating the amount of the

